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BOOK REVIEWS
Living with Oil: Promises, Peaks, and Declines on Mexico’s Gulf Coast by Lisa
Breglia (Univ. of Texas; 263 pages; 2013)
Narco control of corridors stretching from Chihuahua to Guerrero, together
with endemic corruption, effectuates a certain dual-sovereignty1 and weakens the
social contract in Mexico. This compromised sovereignty is compounded by the
fiscal ramifications of a nearly ten-fold production decline in Pemex’s bellwether
Cantarell field2—at peak, it contributed 40 percent of government revenue. And,
historically, the looming presence of the United States and foreign capital3 has
contributed to alternating currents of nationalism and liberalization, with
concomitant adjustments in relative levels of nation-state authority.
Those interested in these dynamic institutional forces will take interest in
Living with Oil. The coupled anthropologic and political-economic lessons to be
drawn from Lisa Breglia’s truly interdisciplinary work facilitate needed historical
and jurisprudential perspective on resource extraction assemblages and their
implications for the Mexican energy reforms. In Living with Oil, Breglia explores
the “to-and-fro tensions between state and private interests and concomitant resource
peaks and declines.” Her analysis is regionally grounded in and around Campeche,
on Mexico’s southeastern Gulf Coast. There intensive commercial extraction of palo
de tinte (a tree which yields a prized dye) and chicle (a key ingredient in Wrigley’s
original chewing gum), and, more recently, shrimp, has hollowed out coastal
frontline communities both developmentally and environmentally from colonial
times. Breglia’s case study of Pemex’s Cantarell operations reveals the latest in a
hauntingly similarly pattern: even at peak production in 2003, Mexico did not
convert hydrocarbon resources into sustainable benefits to affected frontline
communities.
In this way, Living with Oil’s makes its most significant contribution in Part
II, “The Pesquera and the Petrolera,” where Breglia presents her ethnographies of
fishing and oil in and around Campeche’s highly bio-diverse Laguna de Términos,

1. See, e.g., George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security,
THE ARMY WAR COLL., STRATEGIC STUDIES INST. (Dec. 2010), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=1033 (citing CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1938)).
2. For context, note well: at its peak production of 2.1 million barrels of crude oil per day (mn.
bbls/d), bellwether Cantarell was one of the five biggest, “super-giant” oil fields in the word. See, e.g.,
Matthew R. Simmons, The World’s Giant Oilfields: How Many Exist? How Much Do They Produce?
How Fast are they Declining? Colo. School of Mines, M. King Hubbert Ctr. for Petroleum Supply Studies
Newsletter #2002/1 at 1, 3–4 (Jan. 2002), http://hubbert.mines.edu/news/Simmons_02-1.pdf. Excluding
Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar field (field-by-field production figures are considered a state secret), these supergiants (each producing over 1 mn. bbls/d) together represented a full one-eight of world crude production.
Id. Of the group, Cantarell was the most recent discovery (in 1976) and the last to ever join this club. Id.
3. Widely attributed to former president Porfirio Díaz, the popular saying, “¡Pobre México! ¡Tan
lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los Estados Unidos!” (“Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the
United States”) neatly captures the complex implications of this unique geopolitical relationship.
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where despite its federally-protected status, “federal authority doesn’t exist.”4 There,
just after commercial shrimping left artisanal fishing severely compromised in the
mid-twentieth century, production of the other marine patrimony, Cantarell oil, was
ramping up a few dozen miles away. In both cases Breglia examines the “lived
experiences” and effects of these commodities cycles, showing in granular detail
how producers, Campeche state, and municipalities failed to effectively capture
resource rents. In what feels like the scholarly soul of the book, this section teaches
that top-down decision-making and concomitant failure to pay attention to local
conditions (as in Pemex’s plainly unsustainable, in-kind compensation programs)5
are indicative of a larger sphere of “contested equivalences”6 surrounding mining
and minerals development. This sphere, in turn, reveals a variety of feedback loops
that must be taken into account for sound natural resource, business,7 and even
national security8 decision-making.
As Breglia moves on from the pesquera and petrolera framework to Gulf
oil, she emphasizes a tension underlying the current rationale of the necessity of
involving foreign technology and capital to counter the downside of peak oil in
Mexico. Since the 1938 nationalization of hydrocarbons,9 Mexico has consistently
maintained de jure sovereignty over its hydrocarbons. However, beyond its wildly

4. LISA BREGLIA, LIVING WITH OIL: PROMISES, PEAKS, AND DECLINES ON MEXICO’S GULF COAST
13 (2013).
5. For example, the donation of asphalt, an unrefined crude oil byproduct, for construction of roads
that improved access to Pemex’s own facilities. See also id. at 188–89 (asserting that Pemex’s “culture of
compensation” defines benefits for oil-affected regions, including Laguna de Términos, in wholly
economic terms).
6. Cf. FABIANA LI, UNEARTHING CONFLICT: CORPORATE MINING, ACTIVISM, AND EXPERTISE IN
PERU (2015) (arguing that the concept of equivalences—i.e., “methods by which to quantify and compare
things such as pollution”—are central to explaining, and understanding, resource conflicts).
7. For a case regarding the business costs of not squarely addressing social and environmental
concerns, see, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, Barrick Gold Must Face U.S. Lawsuit over Mothballed Mine,
REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/01/barrick-gold-lawsuit-idUSL2N0WY
27F20150401#LePlAPR4VxOvBTA2.97 (noting, in part, Barrick’s $5 billion loss on its halted PascuaLama mine in Chile due to environmental issues surrounding glaciers and pollution).
8. Insofar as many view the failure of a timely transition to renewables renewables and failure to
mitigate climate change natural security threat. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NAT’L SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE: FINDINGS FROM SELECT FED. REPORTS (May 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/National_Security_Implications_of_Changing_Climate_Fi
nal_051915.pdf.
9. This remains a touchstone moment of national pride and unity.
With the expropriation of foreign oil properties, a wave of delirious enthusiasm swept
over Mexico. . . . Old inhabitants said there had never been such manifestations of the
unity of the Mexican people in the history of Mexico as followed the appeals to the
people to uphold the Constitution and the sovereignty of Mexico. It was shared by
people who lost sight of oil in their belief that Mexicans must present a united and solid
front.
Josephus Daniels, The Oil Expropriation, in THE MEXICO READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 452,
452 (Gilbert M. Joseph & Timothy J. Henderson, eds., 2002).
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successfully development of shallow-water Cantarell,10 Pemex has proved unable to
develop unconventional energy resources which dominate the twenty-first century
oil landscape. Energy reform aside, Mexico has largely papered over oil-related
revenue decline with increasing debt.11 In this context, Breglia poses the question:
can Mexico manage its remaining reserves (by law, national patrimony) to ensure
citizen welfare? Living with Oil also raises the question: can it do it any better with
“unconventional” help12 from the likes of Schlumberger and Exxon?
While Living with Oil was published in 2013, before the constitutional
changes and secondary implementing law which comprise Mexican energy reform,
Breglia’s judicious analysis of the forerunners to this reform, including 2008
reforms, remains relevant. Even as the 2013 constitutional reforms proved more
liberal than those originally proposed by Enrique Peña Nieto and the PRI, they
represent the latest in a series of progressive, pseudo-privatization efforts. So while
oil is still symbolically important and politicians are therefore wary to explicitly refer
to privatization, Mexico has already effectuated the “clear fissure between de jure
constitutional resource sovereignty and de facto private-sector participation in the
everyday activities of the oil industry.” As Breglia notes, while NAFTA did not
directly address energy liberalization, it was a “crucial hinge for liberalization of
hydrocarbon sector” in that it “establish[ed] a safe environment for Pemex’s
creditworthiness and foreign investment and an atmosphere conducive to the
entrance of foreign multinationals in Mexico’s oil-fields.”13
Nonetheless, it is clear from Living with Oil that, despite the enmeshed
issues of economic liberalization and resource sovereignty, there is common ground
between Mexico’s left and right on the need to modernize Pemex. This suggests that
Pemex, reformulated under recent reforms as a “state-owned public enterprise,”
could make contributions to national development.14 As the energy reform contours
are mapped, critical questions remain: How can Mexico leverage its enduring
sovereignty instinct toward a sustainable, inclusive, post-carbon economy and away
from the “two Mexicos”15 paradigm? Will the “offshoring” of Mexico’s energy
resources, which brings new structural components to the resource extraction
assemblage, also comprise improved tools to provide for citizen welfare?
Living with Oil ends on a strong note by attempting to answer these difficult
questions.16 In the closing Part III, “Post-Peak Politics: Energy Reform and the Race
10. As Breglia reports, Pemex cannot be wholly credited with the supergiant’s discovery: the
eponymous fisherman, Rudesindo Cantarell, convinced the government to investigate the oil slick he
discovered. BREGLIA, supra note 4, at 33–34.
11. Gregor MacDonald, Should Mexico Stop Exporting Oil?, GREGOR.US (June 23, 2009), http://gre
gor.us/oil/should-mexico-stop-exporting-oil/.
12. That is, for deep-water or shale plays.
13. BREGLIA, supra note 4, at 199.
14. As through the newly established Pemex- supported sovereign wealth fund. See generally Paul
A. Sánchez Campos, Whatever Happened to the Mexican Oil Bonanza? The Challenges of Mexico’s New
Oil Fund, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. 291 (2016).
15. See, e.g., The two Mexicos, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 19, 2015) (noting that Mexico, “[w]ith its
combination of modernity and poverty, provides lessons for all emerging markets”).
16. This effort gains credibility through the “heavy-lifting” of her earlier frontlines- and politicaleconomy focused ethnographies and histories. Breglia grounds the critical implications of these important,
yet macro- frames of analysis with geographic—or policy—frontline realities.
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to Claim the Gulf of Mexico,” Breglia analyzes the dual frontiers of domestic energy
reform and international law regarding prospective development of deepwater,
transboundary oil and gas reserves in the Gulf . The primary lesson from Breglia’s
exploration of these two “places of exception” is that, given the exigencies of the
post-Cantarell tranche of energy resources,17 the resulting tilt to increasingly
complex legal18 and technological19 systems has important ramifications in the
sovereignty domain. First, even as resources are “marshalled . . . simply to maintain
current systems,”20 the contested space21 of offshore development has a
deterritorializing effect.22 Second, despite the environmental risks of developing
deepwater resources made clear by the Deepwater Horizon spill, federal authority in
this contested space is necessarily limited. Lastly, development of unconventional
resources remains an unsure bet, as initial onshore energy liberalization efforts
designed to stimulate unconventional resources in the Chicontepec basin have
shown.23
Given the complex contours that surround unconventional oil and gas
development and the recent energy reforms in Mexico, Breglia does well to close
Living with Oil by exploring alternative, sustainable futures near the Campeche
frontline. Despite contrasting the positive externalities of these differing types of
development on the Gulf Coast and in Campeche’s interior (i.e., eco-tourism),
Breglia missed an opportunity in not conducting one last “glocal” (i.e., coupled
global/local) analysis of the sort that made the rest of the book so compelling. Still,

17. Alternatively, as some have articulated, a “terminal phase of development.” See Gregor
MacDonald, Returning to Simplicity (Whether We Want To or Not), FINANCIAL SENSE (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/gregor-macdonald/2012/01/19/returning-to-simplicity).
18. For instance, negotiating access to transboundary, deepwater hydrocarbon resources through
complex bilateral treaties (including—unique in the case of transboundary reservoirs—unitization-like
provisions). As lawyer, energy analyst, and former military intelligence officer Jeff Vail has noted,
Mexico’s “ability to actually attract this investment will, I think, be determined by the Mexican state’s
ability to cordon off certain geographic areas and legal relationships to make these investments secure and
stable in the eyes of foreigners.” Jeff Vail, THE OIL DRUM (Mar. 8, 2009), http://www.theoildrum.com/
node/5172.
19. For example, deep-water drilling and attendant technology and expert services of oilfield service
companies like Schlumberger, Halliburton and Baker Hughes.
20. See MacDonald, supra note 17.
21. Cf. BREGLIA, supra note 4, at 236–45, 257–58 (involving a “fraught and contested process of
political and economic negotiation” that implicates the intertwined issues of resource nationalism and
foreign capital and technology, as well as concomitant “national and transnational politics”).
22. Cf. Vail, supra note 18 (suggesting nascent indicators of failure of the nation state model, such
as drug violence in Mexico); Jeff Vail, The Problem of Growth and the Decline of the Nation-State (May
11, 2009), jeffvail.net (arguing, in part, that “overlapping power networks” such as “multinational
corporations, trans-national black- and gray-market networks, cross-border cultural affinities and religious
identities” characterize the transitions to a post-Cartesian “Market-State”).
23. Breglia notes that, despite contract liberalization during the Fox administration, production has
not been boosted at Mexico’s flagging onshore, heavy crude Chicontepec basin which represented, at the
time, roughly one-half of Mexico’s proven, non-Cantarell reserves. BREGLIA, supra note 4, at 59. That
Shell has recently cancelled projects in the Canadian tar-sands and the offshore, arctic Alaska would seem
to confirm this uncertainty. See, e.g., Steven Mufson and Chris Mooney, Large Losses in Tar Sands and
the Arctic Drag Down Shell’s Earning, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/29/royal-dutch-shell-reports-weak-earnings-on-large-arcticand-tar-sands-losses/.
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Breglia’s consistent strength is systems thinking.24 Such holistic analysis is essential
for understanding the risks, opportunities, and implications of the recent Mexican
energy reforms—and more broadly, the ongoing energy transition away from oil,
coal, natural gas, and renewables.
Lastly, Breglia mined rich and varied materials to produce her engaging
work. A reader who is skeptical that a cultural anthologist might give, say, aspects
of finance or petroleum geology short, if any, shrift, will be consistently proven
wrong. Beyond her deep ethnographic field and archival research, Breglia exhibits
an impressive command of the breadth and depth of the coupled social,
environmental, and geopolitical complexities of resource assemblages, especially
surrounding oil. Citing to array of technical scientific papers,25 industry
publications,26 government reports and regulations, histories of modern Mexico,27
and energy and geopolitical analyses,28 Breglia has done her homework—no small
feat for any author attempting a coherent and convincing interdisciplinary work. The
upside for the reader is that, independent of industry or political affiliations, Living
with Oil is consistently objective in advancing a multi-scalar, interdisciplinary, and
analytically forceful study of resource cycles in Mexico.

Colin McKenzie
Class of 2017
University of New Mexico School of Law

24. Ms. Breglia directs the Global Affairs and Interdisciplinary Programs at George Washington
University.
25. See, e.g., BREGLIA supra note 4, at 43–44 (citing M. King Hubbert, SHELL DEVELOPMENT CO.,
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION RESEARCH DIV., PUBL. NO. 95, NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE FOSSIL FUELS
(June 1956), at Figs. 20, 21, also published in AMERICAN PETROLEUM INST., DRILLING AND PRODUCTION
PRACTICES, Proc. Spring Meet. (1956)).
26. See, e.g., BREGLIA supra note 4, at 244 nn.5–6 (citing Gulf of Mexico Western Gap Division
Agreed, Exploration Pending, OIL & GAS J., July 10, 2000, at 30).
27. See, e.g., BREGLIA supra note 4, at 37 n.5, 38, 204 n.4, 211 n.6 (citing LORENZO MEYER, MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE OIL CONTROVERSY, 1917–1942 (Muriel Vasconcellos trans., Univ. Tex.
Press 1977); 37 n.5, 211 n.6 (citing JONATHAN C. BROWN, OIL & REVOLUTION IN MEXICO (1993)).
28. See, e.g., BREGLIA supra note 4, at 279 (referencing analysis by Princeton University Woodrow
Wilson International Center scholar José Luís Alberro, Mexico’s Oil: Who Needs It? in OIL AS A
STRATEGIC RESOURCE IN MEXICO? (Luís de la Calle et al. 2007)); 280 (referencing RICE UNIV. BAKER
INST., POLICY REPORT NO. 35, THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY MARKETS (2007)); 291 (referencing Alan Larson, The Geopolitics of Oil and Natural Gas, 9
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, no. 1, 2004, 10–12); 301 (citing MATT SIMMONS, TWILIGHT IN THE DESERT 15
(2005) (The late Mr. Simmons founded Simmons & Company International, the world’s first investment
banking firm to specialize in the energy sector.)).

